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Abstract
We introduce a single-valued solution concept, the so-called average covering
tree value, for the class of transferable utility games with limited communication
structure represented by a directed graph. The solution is the average of the
marginal contribution vectors corresponding to all covering trees of the directed
graph. The covering trees of a directed graph are those (rooted) trees on the set
of players that preserve the dominance relations between the players prescribed
by the directed graph. The average covering tree value is component efficient
and under a particular convexity-type condition is stable. For transferable
utility games with complete communication structure the average covering tree
value equals to the Shapley value of the game. If the graph is the directed
analog of an undirected graph the average covering tree value coincides with
the gravity center solution.
Keywords: TU game, directed communication structure, marginal contribu-
tion vector, Myerson value, average tree solution, stability
JEL Classification Number: C71
1 Introduction
In classical cooperative game theory it is assumed that any coalition of players may
form. However, in many practical situations the collection of feasible coalitions that
can be formed is restricted by some social, economical, hierarchical, communica-
tional, or technical structure. The study of games with transferable utility (TU)
and limited cooperation represented by means of undirected communication graphs
was initiated by Myerson [10]. In an undirected communication graph on the set
of players, a link between two players is interpreted as the players’ ability to com-
municate bilaterally with each other and therefore only connected coalitions are
feasible. For such games, Myerson [10] introduces the Myerson value which is equal
to the Shapley value of the induced restricted game. However, due to the incomplete
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nature of the communication structure represented via graphs, some marginal con-
tribution vectors considered for the Myerson value can be the same. Koshevoy and
Talman [8] introduce the so-called gravity center or GC solution for a more general
class of TU games with limited cooperation structure. This class contains the games
with undirected communication graph structure as a subclass. For this class of TU
games, the GC solution is equal to the average of all different marginal contribution
vectors and is therefore (generically) equal to the gravity center of the convex hull
of all marginal contribution vectors. Each marginal contribution vector corresponds
to a specific (rooted) tree that is induced by the underlying cooperation structure.
For TU games with undirected graph cooperation structure, when only those trees
that are also spanning trees of the graph are taken into account, then the average of
the corresponding marginal contribution vectors is the average tree or AT solution.
The AT solution is introduced by Herings, van der Laan and Talman [4] for the
class of TU games with cycle-free undirected graph cooperation structure, and by
Herings, van der Laan, Talman and Yang [5] for the whole class of TU games with
undirected graph cooperation structure.
In this paper we consider communication structures introduced by means of di-
rected graphs (digraphs) which represent partial orderings of the players. For a
directed link in an arbitrary digraph there are two possible different basic interpre-
tations. One interpretation is that a link is directed to indicate which player has
initiated the communication but at the same time it represents a fully developed
communication link where players are able to communicate in both directions with
each other. In such a case, following Myerson [10], it is natural to assume that there
is no subordination of players and to focus on component efficient values. Another
interpretation of a directed link assumes that a directed link represents the only
one-way communication situation. In this case we have again different possibilities
for the interpretation of a directed link. The first option is when the communication
between players is supposed to be possible only along the directed paths in the di-
graph, for example a flow situation. This assumption leads to the solution concepts
of web values, in particular the tree value, and the average web value for cycle-free
digraph games introduced in Khmelnitskaya and Talman [7] and the covering values
for cycle-free digraph games studied in Li and Li [9]. Another option is to assume
that the digraph represents the subordination of players such that after each player
any of his subordinates may follow as long as this does not hurt the total subordi-
nation among all players prescribed by the digraph. An example of such a situation
is a sequencing problem when the tasks that have to be performed are not neces-
sarily linearly ordered but the ordering of the tasks is represented by some directed
graph. Suppose at every moment only one task can be performed. When some task
is completed, the next task can be any of the tasks that are immediate successors
in the digraph or one among those of which the performance is independent of the
task and does not block the performance of any immediate successor of that task.
In this paper we abide by the latter interpretation of a directed link. The main
advantage of this approach is to introduce a single-valued solution for the class of
TU games with limited cooperation represented by directed communication graphs
which is component efficient. To define such a solution, we first introduce for any
directed graph the set of so-called covering trees. The root of a covering tree of
a digraph is one of the undominated players (nodes) of the digraph. The root
has one of the undominated players in every component of the remaining players
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as immediate successors in the tree. On its turn each of these latter players has
as immediate successors one of undominated players in each subcomponent of the
remaining players in the component the player belongs to, and so on. Since every
digraph on a finite set has at least one undominated node, the collection of covering
trees defined in this way is nonempty. In every covering tree of a digraph, the
dominance relation between players in the graph is preserved. The average covering
tree value of a TU game with digraph communication structure is the average of
marginal contribution vectors that correspond to all covering trees of the underlying
digraph. We also give a convexity-type condition under which the solution is an
element of the core and therefore cannot be blocked by any subset of connected
players. In case the digraph is a tree this condition is weaker than superadditivity.
For this case there is only one covering tree, the tree itself, and the average covering
tree value is equal to the tree value first introduced in Demange [1] under the name of
hierarchical outcome and later axiomatized in Khmelnitskaya [6]. For digraph games
with complete communication structure the average covering tree value equals to the
Shapley value (cf. Shapley [11]) of the TU game. The solution can also be applied
for undirected graph games by taking the directed analog of an undirected graph,
obtained by replacing each undirected link between two players by two directed links
in both directions. For this class of games, the average covering tree value is equal
to the GC solution. When for the class of undirected graph games only the covering
trees of the directed analog that are also spanning trees of the graph are considered,
the average covering tree value coincides with the AT solution.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Basic definitions and notation are
introduced in Section 2. Covering trees of a directed graph and the average covering
tree value are defined in Section 3. Section 4 studies properties of the average
covering tree value, in particular, its efficiency and stability. The application of the
average covering tree value to undirected graph games is discussed in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
A cooperative game with transferable utility (TU game) is a pair (N, v), where N =
{1, . . . , n} is a finite set of n players with n ≥ 2, and v : 2N → IR is a characteristic
function defined on the power set of N , satisfying v(∅) = 0. A subset S ∈ 2N is a
coalition and the associated real number v(S) represents the worth of coalition S.
We denote the set of TU games with fixed player set N by GN . For simplicity of
notation and if no ambiguity appears we write v instead of (N, v) when we refer to a
TU game. A game v ∈ GN is superadditive if v(S∪T ) ≥ v(S)+v(Q) for all S,Q ∈ 2
N ,
such that S ∩Q = ∅, and v ∈ GN is convex if v(S ∪Q) + v(S ∩Q) ≥ v(S) + v(Q),
for all S,Q ∈ 2N .
A payoff vector is a vector x ∈ IRN with ith component xi the payoff to player
i ∈ N . A value on GN is a function ξ : GN → IR
N that assigns to any TU game
v ∈ GN a payoff vector ξ(v) ∈ IR
N . In the sequel we use notation x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi
for a vector x ∈ IRN and S ∈ 2N . |A| denotes the cardinality of a finite set A. For
a TU game v ∈ GN , a payoff vector x ∈ IR
N is efficient if x exactly distributes the
worth v(N) of the grand coalition N , i.e. x(N) = v(N). A value ξ on GN is efficient
if for any game v ∈ GN the payoff vector ξ(v) is efficient. The core (cf. Gillies [3])
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of a TU game v ∈ GN is defined as
C(v) = {x ∈ IRN | x(N) = v(N), x(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ⊆ N}.
A value ξ is stable on G ⊆ GN if for any game v ∈ G with nonempty core C(v),
ξ(v) ∈ C(v).
The communication structure on the player setN is specified by a graph, directed
or undirected, on N . An undirected graph on N consists of a set of nodes, being
the elements of N , and a collection of unordered pairs of nodes L ⊆ LcN , where
LcN = { {i, j} | i, j ∈ N, i 6= j} is the complete undirected graph without loops on
N and an unordered pair {i, j} ∈ L is a link between i and j. A directed graph,
or digraph, on N is given by a collection of ordered pairs of nodes Γ ⊆ ΓcN , where
ΓcN = {(i, j) | i, j ∈ N, i 6= j} is the complete directed graph without loops on N
and an ordered pair (i, j) ∈ Γ is a directed link from i to j. An undirected graph
L on N will be identified with its directed analog, denoted ΓL, that is obtained by
replacing each undirected link {i, j} in L by the two directed links (i, j) and (j, i),
i.e., ΓL = {(i, j) | {i, j} ∈ L}.
For a digraph Γ on N , a sequence of different nodes (i1, . . . , ik), k ≥ 2, is a path
in Γ between node i1 and node ik if {(ih, ih+1), (ih+1, ih)}∩Γ 6= ∅ for h = 1, . . . , k−1.
A sequence of different nodes (i1, . . . , ik), k ≥ 2, is a directed path in Γ from i1 to
ik if (ih, ih+1) ∈ Γ for h = 1, . . . , k − 1. If there exists a directed path in Γ from
node i ∈ N to node j ∈ N , then j is a successor of i and i is a predecessor of j
in Γ. If (i, j) ∈ Γ, then node j is an immediate successor of node i and player i
is an immediate predecessor of j in Γ. For i ∈ N , SΓ(i) is the set of successors of
node i in Γ and SΓ(i) = SΓ(i) ∪ {i} is the set of successors of i in Γ together with
node i. A path (i1, . . . , ik), k ≥ 3, in Γ is a cycle in Γ if {(ik, i1), (i1, ik)} ∩ Γ 6= ∅,
and a directed path (i1, . . . , ik), k ≥ 2, in Γ is a directed cycle in Γ if (ik, i1) ∈ Γ.
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A digraph Γ on N is cycle-free if it contains no directed cycles, i.e., no node is a
successor of itself. A digraph Γ on N is strongly cycle-free if it is cycle-free and
contains no cycles.
Given a digraph Γ on N and a coalition S ∈ 2N , the subgraph of Γ on S is the
digraph Γ|S = {(i, j) ∈ Γ | i, j ∈ S} on S. A coalition of players S ∈ 2
N forms a
network in the digraph Γ if S is connected, i.e., for any two different players i, j ∈ S
there is a path in Γ|S between i and j. By definition, the empty set and all singleton
coalitions are networks. For S ∈ 2N , a subcoalition Q ⊆ S is a component of S in
Γ if Q is a network in Γ|S and cannot form a larger network in Γ|S with any other
player i ∈ S \Q. For S ∈ 2N , KΓ(S) denotes the collection of networks in Γ|S and
K̂Γ(S) denotes the collection of components of S in Γ.
A digraph T on N is a tree if it has a unique node without predecessors, the
root of the tree, denoted by r(T ), and for every other node in N there is a unique
directed path in T from r(T ) to that node. Notice that a tree is a strongly cycle-free
digraph. A node in a tree having no successors is a leaf. A tree T is a spanning tree
of a digraph Γ on N if every directed link of T is also a directed link of Γ, i.e., it
holds that T ⊆ Γ. A digraph composed by a number of disjoint trees is a forest.
Given a digraph Γ on N and a coalition S ∈ 2N , node i ∈ S dominates node
j ∈ S in S if j ∈ SΓ|S (i) and i /∈ SΓ|S (j). Node i ∈ S is an undominated node of S
in Γ if for every predecessor j of i in Γ|S there exists a directed path in Γ|S from
1Notice that in a digraph a cycle of length 2 is not well defined.
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i to j, i.e., j ∈ SΓ|S (i) whenever i ∈ SΓ|S (j). Notice that an undominated node of
S in Γ is either a node in S without predecessors in the subgraph Γ|S or a member
of at least one directed cycle in Γ|S . Since N is assumed to be finite, any coalition
S ∈ 2N \ ∅ has at least one undominated node in any digraph on N . For a digraph
Γ on N and a coalition S ∈ 2N , UΓ(S) denotes the set of undominated nodes of S
in Γ. A tree has precisely one undominated player–the root of the tree.
A pair (v,Γ) of a TU game v ∈ GN and a communication digraph Γ on N
constitutes a game with directed communication structure or digraph game on N .
The set of all digraph games on a fixed player set N is denoted by GΓN . A value on
GΓN is a function ξ : G
Γ
N → IR
N that assigns to every digraph game (v,Γ) a vector
of payoffs ξ(v,Γ) ∈ IRN . For a digraph game (v,Γ) ∈ GΓN , a payoff vector x ∈ IR
N
is component efficient if x(K) = v(K) for all K ∈ K̂Γ(N), and x is efficient if
x(N) = v(N). A value ξ on GΓN is component efficient if for any digraph game
(v,Γ) ∈ GΓN it holds that ξ(v,Γ) is component efficient, and ξ is efficient if for
any digraph game (v,Γ) ∈ GΓN it holds that ξ(v,Γ) is efficient. Throughout the
paper we admit that in a digraph game only players forming a network are able to
cooperate and obtain the worth of their coalition. Whence the core of a digraph
game (v,Γ) ∈ GΓN is defined as the set of component efficient payoff vectors that are
not dominated by any network, i.e.,
C(v,Γ) = {x ∈ IRN | x(K) = v(K), ∀K ∈ K̂Γ(N); x(S) ≥ v(S), ∀S ∈ KΓ(N)}.
A value ξ is stable on G ⊆ GΓN if for any digraph game (v,Γ) ∈ G with nonempty
core C(v,Γ), ξ(v,Γ) ∈ C(v,Γ).
In what follows without loss of generality it is assumed that the grand coalition
N forms a network in the given communication digraph, otherwise each component
in the digraph can be considered separately. Notice that for a digraph game for
which the grand coalition is a network every component efficient value provides an
efficient payoff vector.
3 The average covering tree value
In this section we introduce a new single-valued solution concept on the class of
digraph games. The value is based on the assumption that the digraph underlying
the communication structure represents the subordination of players such that after
each player any of his subordinates may follow as long as this does not hurt the
total subordination among the players prescribed by the digraph. Notice from the
previous section that the class of digraph games contains the class of undirected
graph games as a subclass when the undirected graphs are identified with their
directed analogs.
As solution for a digraph game we take the average of the marginal contribution
vectors that are induced by all so-called covering trees of the digraph. A covering
tree of a digraph is a tree defined on the entire player set which preserves the
subordination of players (nodes) introduced by the digraph. The root of a covering
tree is one of the undominated nodes of the grand coalition in the digraph. As
immediate successors of the root we take one undominated node of each component
of the set of remaining nodes. Similarly, as immediate successors of any one of these
nodes we take one of the undominated nodes of each subcomponent of the set of
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remaining nodes in the component the node belongs to, and so on. Formally, given a
digraph Γ on N , for the construction of a covering tree T of Γ we apply the following
algorithm.
Algorithm 3.1
0. Choose i ∈ UΓ(N). Set T = ∅, Qi = N \ {i}, and Qj = ∅ for j 6= i.
1. Let KˆΓ(Qi) = {K1, . . . ,Km}. For k = 1, . . . ,m, choose jk ∈ UΓ(Kk) and set
Qjk = Kk \ {jk}. Set T = T ∪ {(i, j1), . . . , (i, jm)} and Qi = ∅.
2. If Qj = ∅ for all j ∈ N , then stop. Otherwise, choose i ∈ N such that Qi 6= ∅
and return to Step 1.
In the starting step the root r(T ) of the covering tree is chosen among the
undominated nodes of N in Γ, i.e., r(T ) ∈ UΓ(N). We arrive to the iterative step
with some node i selected in the previous step. Node i is an undominated node
of some network in Γ where Qi is the set of remaining nodes in this network, in
particular, when coming from the starting step node i is the already chosen root
r(T ) and Qi = N \ {r(T )}. The set of nodes in Qi is the union of one or more
components, denoted by K1, . . . ,Km. In each component Kk, k = 1, . . . ,m, an
undominated node jk is chosen, which becomes an immediate successor of i in the
tree T and by Qjk we denote the set of remaining nodes in Kk, i.e., Qjk = Kk \{jk}.
If all sets Qj , i ∈ N , are empty, then there are no nodes left and the construction
of the covering tree T is completed. Otherwise, some node i with a nonempty set
Qi is chosen and repeat the procedure.
Since the grand coalition is assumed to be a network, the set of nodes in a
covering tree coincides with the set of nodes of the digraph. Notice that a covering
tree of a digraph may contain links that that do not belong to the digraph, i.e.,
a covering tree is not necessarily a spanning tree of the digraph. For an arbitrary
digraph the number of covering trees depends on the number of undominated players
in each component of all subgraphs. In case the digraph is a tree, there exists only
one undominated node in every component of any subgraph of the tree, so that the
only covering tree is the tree itself. On the other hand, for the complete digraph
there exists a directed link from any node to any other node, so that there is only
one component in any subgraph and every node of any coalition is undominated.
Hence, the number of covering trees of the complete graph ΓcN on N is equal to n!
and every covering tree is a directed line-graph.
The validity of the next proposition follows straightforwardly from Algorithm 3.1
for the construction of a covering tree.
Proposition 3.2 Given a digraph Γ on N , a tree T on N is a covering tree of Γ if
and only if it holds that
(i) r(T ) ∈ UΓ(N);
(ii) for all i ∈ N and K ∈ K̂Γ(ST (i)) there exists a unique (i, j) ∈ T such that
K = ST (j) and j ∈ UΓ(ST (j)).
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Example 3.3 Consider the digraphs Γ = {(1, 3), (2, 3)}, Γ′ = {(1, 2), (2, 3), (3, 4), (4, 1)},
and Γ′′ = {(1, 2), (2, 3), (3, 2), (3, 4), (4, 1), (1, 4), (3, 5)}, as depicted in Figure 1.
Figure 1
a) Digraph Γ.
1 2
3
b) Digraph Γ′.
1 2
4 3
c) Digraph Γ′′.
1 2
4 3
5
The sets of undominated nodes in digraphs Γ, Γ′, and Γ′′ are {1, 2}, {1, 2, 3, 4},
and {1, 2, 3, 4}, respectively. Following Algorithm 3.1 we may construct the covering
trees of digraphs Γ, Γ′ and Γ′′ as depicted in Figure 2.
Figure 2
a) Covering trees of Γ. b) Covering trees of Γ′.
T1
1
2
3
T2
2
1
3
T ′1
1
2
3
4
T ′2
2
3
4
1
T ′3
3
4
1
2
T ′4
4
1
2
3
c) Covering trees of Γ′′.
T ′′1
1
2
3
4 5
T ′′2
1
3
2 4 5
T ′′3
2
3
1 5
4
T ′′4
2
3
4 5
1
T ′′5
3
4 5
1
2
T ′′6
3
1 5
2 4
T ′′7
4
1
2
3
5
T ′′8
4
1
3
2 5
We explain in detail the construction of covering trees of digraph Γ. In Γ both
nodes 1 and 2 are undominated and can be chosen as the root of a covering tree. If
node 1 is taken as the root, the remaining nodes 2 and 3 form a network with only
node 2 being undominated, yielding covering tree T1 = {(1, 2), (2, 3)}. If node 2 is
taken as the root, the remaining nodes 1 and 3 form a network with node 1 being
undominated, yielding covering tree T2 = {(2, 1), (1, 3)}.
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As we can see, covering trees may have different structures, in particular, some
of them can be line-graphs. Also, covering trees are not always spanning trees. For
example, both covering trees of the digraph Γ are not spanning trees of Γ. In fact,
Γ has no spanning trees. However, all four covering trees of Γ′ are spanning line-
graphs. Among the covering trees of Γ′′ the trees T ′′1 , T
′′
4 , T
′′
5 , and T
′′
7 are spanning
trees while T ′′2 , T
′′
3 , T
′′
6 , and T
′′
8 are not.
The next theorem uncovers some structural relations between a digraph and its
covering trees.
Theorem 3.4 Let T be a covering tree of a digraph Γ on N , then it holds that
(i) if (i, j) ∈ Γ and i /∈ SΓ(j), then SΓ(j) ⊆ ST (i);
(ii) for all i ∈ N , ST (i) ∈ KΓ(N);
(iii) for all i, j ∈ N , if ST (i) ∩ ST (j) = ∅, then ST (i) ∪ ST (j) /∈ KΓ(N).
Proof.
(i) Let i, j ∈ N be such that (i, j) ∈ Γ and i /∈ SΓ(j). If i = r(T ), then i /∈ SΓ(j)
and i 6= j imply SΓ(j) ⊆ N \ {i} = ST (i). Suppose i 6= r(T ). The set {i} ∪ SΓ(j) is
a network in Γ and for every S ∈ 2N such that S ⊇ {i} ∪ SΓ(j), node i dominates
any node of SΓ(j) in the subgraph Γ|S . Take any k ∈ N such that i ∈ ST (k). Then
due to Algorithm 3.1 for constructing covering trees ST (k) ⊇ {i} ∪ SΓ(j) and so
any node of SΓ(j) is dominated by i in the component of ST (k) in Γ containing
{i} ∪ SΓ(j). This also holds for the node k
′ satisfying (k′, i) ∈ T . Since ST (i) is
the component of ST (k
′) in Γ containing {i} ∪ SΓ(j) and i /∈ SΓ(j), it follows that
SΓ(j) ⊆ ST (i) \ {i} = ST (i).
(ii) Let i ∈ N . If i = r(T ) then ST (i) = N and by assumption N is a network
in Γ. If i 6= r(T ), there exists j ∈ N such that (j, i) ∈ T which implies ST (i) ∈
K̂Γ(ST (j)). Hence, ST (i) ∈ KΓ(N).
(iii) Let i, j ∈ N such that ST (i) ∩ ST (j) = ∅. Since T is a covering tree, there
exist h, k,m ∈ N with k 6= m satisfying (h, k), (h,m) ∈ T, ST (i) ⊆ ST (k), and
ST (j) ⊆ ST (m). Since ST (k) and ST (m) are two different components of ST (h) in
Γ, it holds that ST (k)∪ST (m) /∈ KΓ(N). Since ST (i) ⊆ ST (k) and ST (j) ⊆ ST (m),
also ST (i) ∪ ST (j) /∈ KΓ(N).
Property (i) says that a covering tree of a directed graph preserves the subordi-
nation between players prescribed by the digraph in the sense that if in a digraph Γ
node j is an immediate successor of node i but i is not a successor of j, then j and
all its successors in Γ are also successors of i in any covering tree of Γ. Property
(ii) shows that in every covering tree, each node together with all of its successors
forms a connected set in the digraph. Property (iii) states that the union of different
branches of a covering tree cannot be connected in the digraph.
Given a digraph game (v,Γ) ∈ GΓN and covering tree T of Γ, the marginal con-
tribution vector mT (v,Γ) ∈ IRN corresponding to T is defined as the payoff vector
mTi (v,Γ) = v(ST (i))−
∑
K∈K̂Γ(ST (i))
v(K), for all i ∈ N. (1)
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At the marginal contribution vector corresponding to a covering tree, as his
payoff a player receives the difference between the worth of the set composed by
himself together with all his successors in the covering tree and the total worths of
the components of the set of all his successors in the covering tree. This difference
is the contribution of the player when he joins his successors in the covering tree to
form a network.
Let T Γ denote the collection of covering trees of a digraph Γ.
Definition 3.5 For a digraph game (v,Γ) ∈ GΓN , the average covering tree value
(ACT value) is the average of the marginal contribution vectors corresponding to
all covering trees of the digraph Γ, i.e.,
ACT (v,Γ) =
1
|T Γ|
∑
T∈T Γ
mT (v,Γ).
Example 3.6 Consider a 5-player digraph game with characteristic function v(S) =
|S|2, S ∈ 2N , and digraph Γ′′ depicted in Figure 1(c). The marginal contribution
vectors corresponding to the eight covering trees depicted in Figure 2(c) are given
by
mT
′′
1 (v,Γ′′) = (9, 7, 7, 1, 1),mT
′′
2 (v,Γ′′) = (9, 1, 13, 1, 1),mT
′′
3 (v,Γ′′) = (3, 9, 11, 1, 1),
mT
′′
4 (v,Γ′′) = (1, 9, 11, 3, 1),mT
′′
5 (v,Γ′′) = (3, 1, 15, 5, 1),mT
′′
6 (v,Γ′′) = (7, 1, 15, 1, 1),
mT
′′
7 (v,Γ′′) = (7, 5, 3, 9, 1), mT
′′
8 (v,Γ′′) = (7, 1, 7, 9, 1).
Whence we obtain that ACT (v,Γ) = (234 ,
17
4 ,
41
4 ,
15
4 , 1).
When the digraph underlying a digraph game is a tree, there is only one cover-
ing tree, which coincides with the digraph itself. In this case the average covering
tree value equals to the tree value for the digraph game because the marginal con-
tribution vector corresponding to a covering tree coincides with the tree value for
the digraph game defined by this tree. The tree value for digraph games with the
digraph being a forest is introduced in Demange [1] under the name of hierarchical
outcome and later axiomatized in Khmelnitskaya [6]. When the digraph is com-
plete, the average covering tree value is the average of the marginal contribution
vectors corresponding to n! covering trees, which are all line-graphs, and therefore
coincides with the Shapley value of the underlying TU game. The particular case of
the average covering tree value for undirected graph games is discussed in Section 5.
4 Efficiency, stability, and other properties
4.1 Component efficiency
Unlike web values, in particular the tree value, and the average web value for cycle-
free digraph games introduced in Khmelnitskaya and Talman [7] and the covering
values for cycle-free digraph games studied in Li and Li [9], all of which in general
are not component efficient, the average covering tree value satisfies component
efficiency for any digraph game independent of the digraph structure.
Theorem 4.1 The average covering tree value is component efficient.
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Proof. Given a digraph game (v,Γ) ∈ GΓN , the average covering tree value is the
average of the marginal contribution vectors corresponding to all covering trees of
digraph Γ. By (1) the marginal contribution vector corresponding to any covering
tree of Γ distributes the worth v(K) of each component K ∈ K̂Γ(N) over all players
in K. Whence the component efficiency of the average covering tree value follows.
4.2 Stability
In case the digraph in a digraph game is a tree, it is shown in Demange [1] that
under the mild condition of superadditivity the corresponding unique marginal con-
tribution vector belongs to the core of the digraph game and therefore, the average
covering tree value is stable. However, for digraph games with general digraph struc-
ture superadditivity cannot guarantee even the nonemptiness of the core. Below we
introduce a sufficient convexity-type condition that provides stability of the average
covering tree value.
Definition 4.2 Given a digraph Γ on N , a network S ∈ K(Γ) is a hierarchical
network in Γ if for any i ∈ S and j ∈ N such that (i, j) ∈ Γ and i /∈ SΓ(j), it holds
that SΓ(j) ⊆ S.
A network in a digraph is hierarchical if whenever a node of the network dom-
inates an immediate successor then this immediate successor together with all his
successors in the digraph also belong to this network. From (i) of Theorem 3.4 we
easily obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 4.3 Given a digraph Γ on N , for any i ∈ N and covering tree T ∈ T Γ,
the coalition ST (i) is a hierarchical network in Γ.
Definition 4.4 A digraph game (v,Γ) ∈ GΓN is Γ-convex if
v(S) + v(Q) ≤ v(S ∪Q) +
∑
K∈K̂Γ(S∩Q)
v(K)
for any S,Q ∈ KΓ(N) satisfying:
(i) S ∪Q ∈ KΓ(N);
(ii) S or Q is a hierarchical network in Γ;
(iii) every K ∈ K̂Γ(S ∩Q) is a hierarchical network in Γ.
Γ-convexity reduces to convexity for the class of graph games with complete
communication structure because for those games all subsets of N are hierarchical
networks. On the other hand, the next proposition shows that Γ-convexity is weaker
than superadditivity for a digraph game with the digraph Γ being a tree.
Proposition 4.5 A superadditive digraph game (v,Γ) ∈ GΓN with digraph Γ being a
tree is Γ-convex.
Proof. Take a superadditive digraph game (v,Γ) ∈ GΓN with Γ being a tree. Let
S,Q ∈ KΓ(N) be two distinct networks such that S ∪ Q is a network in Γ, Q is a
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hierarchical network, and each K ∈ K̂Γ(S ∩ Q) is a hierarchical network in Γ. We
need to show that
v(S ∪Q) +
∑
K∈K̂Γ(S∩Q)
v(K) ≥ v(S) + v(Q).
If S ∩Q = ∅, then superadditivity implies
v(S ∪Q) +
∑
K∈K̂Γ(S∩Q)
v(K) = v(S ∪Q) ≥ v(S) + v(Q),
because v(∅) = 0. Suppose S ∩Q 6= ∅ and S \Q 6= ∅. Then r(Γ|Q) ∈ S ∩Q because
Γ is a tree. Since any K ∈ Kˆ(Γ|S∩Q) must be a hierarchical network, it holds that
S ∩Q = Q, and so Q ⊂ S. This implies
v(S ∪Q) +
∑
K∈K̂Γ(S∩Q)
v(K) = v(S ∪Q) + v(S ∩Q) = v(S) + v(Q).
Next, suppose S ∩Q 6= ∅ and S \Q = ∅. Then r(Γ|S) ∈ S ∩Q, because Γ is a tree.
Since any K ∈ K̂Γ(S ∩Q) must be a hierarchical network, it holds that S ∩Q = S
and S is also a hierarchical network, and so S ⊂ Q. This implies
v(S ∪Q) +
∑
K∈K̂Γ(S∩Q)
v(K) = v(S ∪Q) + v(S ∩Q) = v(Q) + v(S).
The next theorem shows that the average covering tree value is stable on the
class of Γ-convex digraph games.
Theorem 4.6 If a digraph game (v,Γ) ∈ GΓN is Γ-convex, then ACT (v,Γ) ∈ C(v,Γ).
Proof. Consider a Γ-convex digraph game (v,Γ). We show that for every covering
tree T ∈ T Γ it holds that its corresponding marginal contribution vector mT (v,Γ)
is an element of the core and therefore also its average must be. Take any T ∈
T Γ. The component efficiency of ACT (v,Γ) follows from Theorem 4.1. Take any
S ∈ KΓ(N) and consider the subgraph T |S . It has components S1, . . . , Sk′ . Note
that T |S1 , . . . , T |Sk′ are all subtrees of T . For k = 1, . . . , k
′, let rk denote the root
of subtree T |Sk . Without loss of generality, let r1, . . . , rk′ be such that k
1 < k2
implies ST (rk1) ⊂ ST (rk2) or ST (rk1) ∩ ST (rk2) = ∅. For k = 1, . . . , k
′, let Grk
be the set of immediate successors of the nodes of Sk in T that are not in S,
i.e., Grk = {j ∈ N \ S | (i, j) ∈ T for some i ∈ Sk}. Let R = {r1, . . . , rk′} and
I = ∪r∈RGr. We define a tree T
∗ with root rk′ on the set of nodes R∪ I, where the
set of immediate successors of a node r ∈ R is given by Gr and the set of immediate
successors of a node i ∈ I is given by the set
Gi = {r ∈ R| ST (r) ⊂ ST (i), ∄r
′ ∈ R \ {r} with ST (r) ⊂ ST (r
′) ⊂ ST (i)}.
Let I = {i1, . . . , il}. Without loss of generality, let i1, . . . , il′ be such that l
1 < l2
implies k1 ≤ k2 where kh, h = 1, 2, is such that (rkh , ilh) ∈ T
∗. For l = 1, . . . , l′
consider the sets ST (il) and Bil−1 = S ∪ (ST (i1)∪ · · · ∪ST (il−1)). By Corollary 4.3,
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ST (il) is a hierarchical network in Γ for any l = 1, . . . , l
′. To apply the induction
argument on l to show that the set Bil is a network, suppose that Bil−1 is a network.
Notice that for l = 1 the set Bil−1 = S is a network. Let i ∈ N be the unique
immediate predecessor of il in T , then from the construction of T
∗ it follows that
i ∈ S and from (ii) of Proposition 3.2 it follows that ST (il) ∈ K̂Γ(ST (i)). Due to (ii)
of Theorem 3.4 ST (i) is a network which implies that (i, j) ∈ Γ for some j ∈ ST (il).
Because j ∈ ST (il) and i ∈ Bil−1 , (i, j) ∈ Γ implies that their union, which is equal
to Bil , is indeed a network. Moreover, by construction of T
∗, the components of
their possibly empty intersection are the hierarchical networks ST (r), r ∈ Gil . From
Γ-convexity it then follows that
v(S ∪ (ST (i1) ∪ · · · ∪ ST (il−1))) + v(ST (il)) ≤
v(S ∪ (ST (i1) ∪ · · · ∪ ST (il))) +
∑
r∈Gil
v(ST (r)).
By repeated application of this inequality for l = 1, . . . , l′ and since S∪(
l′⋃
l=1
ST (il)) =
ST (rk′) it follows that
v(S) +
l′∑
l=1
v(ST (il)) ≤ v(ST (rk′)) +
l′∑
l=1
∑
r∈Gil
v(ST (r)).
Because {i1, . . . , il′} =
k′⋃
k=1
Grk , the latter inequality can be rewritten as
v(S) +
k′∑
k=1
∑
i∈Grk
v(ST (i)) ≤ v(ST (rk′)) +
k′∑
k=1
∑
i∈Grk
∑
r∈Gi
v(ST (r)).
Since T ∗ is a tree, every hierarchical network ST (rk), k = 1, . . . , k
′, appears exactly
once in the right hand side and we obtain
v(S) +
k′∑
k=1
∑
i∈Grk
v(ST (i)) ≤
k′∑
k=1
v(ST (rk)).
Since for k = 1, . . . , k′, Sk = ST (rk) \ (
⋃
i∈Grk
ST (i)), we have
∑
i∈S
mi
T (v,Γ) =
k′∑
k=1
[v(ST (rk))−
∑
i∈Grk
v(ST (i))].
From the last two equations it follows that
∑
i∈S
mi
T (v,Γ) ≥ v(S), which completes
the proof.
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4.3 Some other properties of the average covering tree value
4.3.1 Linearity and the null-player property
A value ξ on GΓN is linear if for any two digraph games (v,Γ), (w,Γ) ∈ G
Γ
N and all
a, b ∈ IR, it holds that
ξ(av + bw,Γ) = aξ(v,Γ) + bξ(w,Γ),
where av + bw is defined as (av + bw)(S) = av(S) + bw(S) for all S ∈ 2N .
For a digraph game (v,Γ) ∈ GΓN , network S ∈ KΓ(N) and player i ∈ S, the
marginal contribution of player i to network S is defined as
∆
(v,Γ)
i (S) = v(S)−
∑
K∈K̂Γ(S\{i})
v(K).
A value ξ on GΓN satisfies the null-player property if for any digraph game (v,Γ) ∈
GΓN it holds that ξi(v,Γ) = 0 whenever ∆
(v,Γ)
i (S) = 0 for all networks S ∈ KΓ(N)
containing i.
The linearity and the null-player property of the average covering tree value
follow straightforwardly from its definition.
4.3.2 Hierarchical efficiency and the powerless player property
For a digraph Γ defined on N , a coalition S ∈ 2N is a closed hierarchy if it satisfies
the following conditions:
(i) S = SΓ(i) for some i ∈ N ;
(ii) j ∈ N \ S and h ∈ S \ UΓ(S) imply (j, h) 6∈ Γ.
A coalition S is a closed hierarchy in a digraph if it is equal to the set composed
by one of the players in N together with all his successors in the digraph and there
is no player outside S that is an immediate predecessor of a dominated player in S.
If a digraph has only one undominated player, then the grand coalition is a closed
hierarchy.
A value ξ on GΓN is hierarchical efficient if for any digraph game (v,Γ) ∈ G
Γ
N and
closed hierarchy S ∈ 2N it holds that
∑
i∈S
ξi(v,Γ) = v(S).
The hierarchical efficiency of the value implies efficiency for a digraph game with
only one undominated player in the digraph. For a digraph game with the digraph
being a tree, a hierarchically efficient value assigns to every coalition composed by
some player together with all his successors in the tree exactly its worth.
For a digraph Γ on N , a player i ∈ N is powerless if i has no successors in Γ,
i.e., there exists no j ∈ N such that (i, j) ∈ Γ.
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A value ξ on GΓN possesses the powerless player property if for any digraph game
(v,Γ) ∈ GΓN every powerless player receives just his own worth, i.e., ξi(v,Γ) = v({i})
whenever player i ∈ N is a powerless player.
In case the digraph is a tree, the powerless player property means that every
player which is a leaf of the tree receives his own worth.
Proposition 4.7 The average covering tree value satisfies hierarchical efficiency
and the powerless player property.
Proof. Take any digraph game (v,Γ) ∈ GΓN and let S ∈ 2
N be a closed hierarchy.
Clearly, S = SΓ(u) for any u ∈ UΓ(S). Moreover, for all Q ∈ KΓ(N) with Q ) S
we have UΓ(Q) ∩ S = ∅ and for any i ∈ Q \ S there exists Q
′ ∈ K̂Γ(Q \ {i}) such
that S ⊆ Q′. Since the number of players is finite, for all T ∈ T Γ we must have that
S = ST (u) for some u ∈ UΓ(S), which implies
∑
i∈S ACTi(v,Γ) = v(S). Since a
powerless player forms a closed hierarchy by its own, it holds that a value satisfying
hierarchical efficiency also satisfies the powerless player property.
4.3.3 Inessential link property
Given a digraph Γ on N , a directed link (i, j) ∈ Γ is an inessential link if i /∈ SΓ(j)
and there exists i′ ∈ N such that (i, i′) ∈ Γ, i /∈ SΓ(i
′), and j ∈ SΓ(i
′).
A link (i, j) ∈ Γ is inessential if it is possible to reach node j from i also by using
a directed path different than link (i, j). The absence of an inessential link does not
change the set of predecessors of any player.
A value ξ on GΓN possesses the inessential link property if for any digraph game
(v,Γ) ∈ GΓN and inessential link (i, j) ∈ Γ it holds that ξ(v,Γ) = ξ(v,Γ \ {(i, j)}).
Proposition 4.8 The average covering tree value on GΓN satisfies the inessential
link property.
Proof. Take any digraph game (v,Γ) ∈ GΓN and let (i, j) ∈ Γ be an inessential
link, so there exists i′ ∈ N such that (i, i′) ∈ Γ, i /∈ SΓ(i
′), and j ∈ SΓ(i
′). Let
Γ′ = Γ \ {(i, j)}. We claim that T Γ = T Γ
′
.
Take any T ∈ T Γ. Since (i, i′) ∈ Γ and i /∈ SΓ(i
′), property (i) of Theorem 3.4
implies SΓ(i
′) ⊆ ST (i). Hence, for all S ⊇ ST (i), UΓ(S) = UΓ′(S) and K̂Γ(S) =
K̂Γ′(S). Moreover, Γ|ST (i) = Γ
′|ST (i), which implies that T ∈ T
Γ′ .
Conversely, take any T ′ ∈ T Γ
′
. The only difference between Γ and Γ′ is the ab-
sence of the directed link (i, j). So, also for Γ′ we have that (i, i′) ∈ Γ′ and i /∈ SΓ′(i
′).
Again from property (i) of Theorem 3.4 it follows that SΓ′(i
′) ⊆ ST ′(i). Hence, for
all S ⊇ ST ′(i), UΓ′(S) = UΓ(S) and K̂Γ′(S) = K̂Γ(S). Moreover, Γ
′|S
T ′ (i)
= Γ|S
T ′ (i)
,
which implies that T ′ ∈ T Γ.
5 Undirected graph games
In this section we consider the class of undirected (connected) graph games. An
undirected graph L on the set N can be identified with its directed analog ΓL by
replacing each undirected link of L between two nodes by two directed links with
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opposite direction. In the directed analog of an undirected graph, every node in
any network is undominated and therefore any network is a hierarchical network.
This follows from the fact that every successor of a node is also a predecessor of
that node. Moreover, as it follows from (ii) of Proposition 3.2, if (i, j) is a link
in a covering tree T of the directed analog of an undirected graph L, then the set
consisting of j and all his successors in T is a component in L of the successor set
of i in T .
In Koshevoy and Talman [8] the Gravity Center or GC solution is introduced for
TU games where the communication structure between players is represented by an
arbitrary collection of coalitions which includes all singletons and the grand coalition.
When applied to an undirected graph the collection of feasible coalitions is precisely
the set of networks in the graph. In this setting a strictly nested set, denoted by N ,
is a subcollection of feasible coalitions where for each pair of feasible coalitions one
is a subset of the other or their intersection is empty and the union of any number of
disjoint feasible coalitions is not feasible. Each maximal strictly nested set induces
a tree T on N such that for each i ∈ N the set ST (i) is the smallest coalition in N
containing i and (i, j) ∈ T if ST (j) is the largest subset of ST (i) in N containing j.
The GC solution is the average of the marginal contribution vectors that correspond
to the trees that are induced by all maximal strictly nested sets of the set system.
In case the collection of feasible coalitions is the set of networks of an undirected
graph, the set of trees induced by the collection of maximal strictly nested sets is
equal to the set of covering trees of the directed analog of the undirected graph.
This is because for every covering tree the collection of sets consisting of any node
and its successors is a maximal strictly nested set, and conversely every maximal
strictly nested set induces a covering tree with the sets consisting of a node and its
successors being the elements of the strictly nested set.
For an undirected graph game (v, L) on N , let GC(v, L) denote the GC solution
of (v, L), i.e., GC(v, L) is the average of the marginal contribution vectors that
correspond to all maximal strictly nested sets of the collection of networks of the
the graph L. Then the average covering tree of the digraph game (v,ΓL) is equal to
the GC solution of the undirected graph game (v, L).
Proposition 5.1 For an undirected graph game (v, L) it holds that ACT (v,ΓL) =
GC(v, L).
To guarantee that the average covering tree solution is an element of the core of
the game, in Definition 4.4 Γ-convexity was introduced for a digraph game (v,Γ).
In case of an undirected graph game (v, L) we may use ΓL-convexity of the game to
obtain stability and efficiency of the average covering tree solution. This stability
condition coincides with the convexity-type condition given in Koshevoy and Talman
[8].
Proposition 5.2 For an undirected graph game (v, L), the average covering tree
solution ACT (v,ΓL) is an element of the core if for any two networks S and Q in
L such that S ∪Q is a network in L it holds that
v(S) + v(Q) ≤ v(S ∪Q) +
∑
K∈K̂
ΓL
(S∩Q)
v(K). (2)
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Herings et al. [4] introduce the average tree solution for TU games with cycle-
free undirected graph communication structure. This solution is generalized for TU
games with arbitrary undirected graph communication structure in Herings et al.
[5]. The average tree solution is defined as the average of the marginal vectors that
correspond to all spanning normal trees of the undirected graph. For an undirected
graph L on N , a tree T on N is a spanning tree of L if (i, j) ∈ T implies {i, j} ∈ L,
and in Diestel [2] a tree T on N is defined as a normal tree of L if the ends of
every link in L are comparable in the tree order of T . A tree T on N is therefore
a spanning normal tree of L if for every (i, j) ∈ T it holds that {i, j} ∈ L and
ST (j) ∈ K̂ΓL(ST (i)). The collection of spanning normal trees of an undirected
graph corresponds therefore one-to-one to the set of spanning covering trees of its
directed analog.
Proposition 5.3 Let L be an undirected graph on N . A tree T on N is a spanning
normal tree of L if and only if T is a spanning covering tree of ΓL.
On the class of undirected graph games the average tree solution is therefore
equal to the average of the marginal contribution vectors that correspond to all
covering trees that are also spanning trees of the directed analog of the graph. We
remark that for a directed graph not being the directed analog of an undirected graph
spanning covering trees may not exist. For example, the digraph Γ of Example 3.3
has no spanning covering trees.
For undirected graph games, Myerson [10] introduces the Myerson value. In
order to find the Myerson value of an undirected graph game, the so-called Myer-
son restricted game and all permutations on N are considered. Every permutation
yields a marginal contribution vector of the Myerson restricted game and the My-
erson value is the average of all these n! marginal contribution vectors. If the
communication structure of an undirected graph game is not complete, the same
marginal contribution vector may correspond to different permutations. However,
for the average covering tree solution of the directed analog of an undirected graph
game, all marginal contribution vectors differ from each other, see also Koshevoy
and Talman [8].
The next example illustrates for an undirected graph the differences between the
average covering tree solution (or GC solution), the Myerson value, and the average
tree solution.
Example 5.4 Consider the undirected graph game (v, L) with three players, where
L = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}} and v(S) = 0 if |S| ≤ 1 and v(S) = |S|2 if |S| ≥ 2. The
graphical representation of the undirected graph L, its directed analog ΓL, and the
five covering trees of ΓL are depicted in Figure 3.
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a) Undirected graph L.
1 2 3
b) Directed analog ΓL.
1 2 3
Figure 3
c) Covering trees of ΓL.
T1
1
2
3
T2
2
31
T3
3
2
1
T4
1
3
2
T5
3
1
2
For each of the five covering trees of the digraph ΓL shown in Figure 3(c), a
different marginal contribution vector is obtained and their average is equal to the
average covering tree solution of the digraph game (v,ΓL). The five marginal con-
tribution vectors whose average is the GC solution of the undirected graph game
(v, L) coincide with the marginal vectors corresponding to these covering trees. The
covering trees T1, T2, T3 are the spanning normal trees of the undirected graph L,
and their average is equal to the average tree solution of the undirected graph game
(v, L). Those three trees are also the spanning covering trees of the digraph ΓL.
Figure 4
(9, 0, 0) (0, 9, 0)
(0, 0, 9)
x1 + x2 = 4
x2 + x3 = 4
mT2
mT1
mT4
mT5 mT3
In Figure 4, the imputation set of the directed graph game (v,ΓL) is depicted.
The shaded area in the figure shows the set of core allocations and each of the
five extreme points of the core corresponds to a marginal contribution vector cor-
responding to one of the covering trees. The average covering tree solution for the
directed graph game (v,ΓL) and therefore also the GC solution for the undirected
graph game (v, L) is the average of all five different marginal contribution vectors
and is the gravity center of the core for this example. The average tree solution
for the undirected graph game (v, L) is the average of the three marginal contribu-
tion vectors mT1 , mT2 , mT3 . Since there are three players, there are 6 permutations
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with corresponding marginal contribution vectors that determine the Myerson value.
Two permutations, (1, 3, 2) and (3, 1, 2), yield the same marginal vector mT2 . For
the Myerson value, the vector mT2 is therefore counted twice as marginal contri-
bution vector, while each of the other four vectors are counted once as marginal
contribution vector.
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